Organized vs. competitive corruption by Celentani, Marco & Ganuza, Juan-José
Organized vs. Competitive Corruption
MARCO CELENTANI ∗ celentan@eco.uc3m.es
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain
JUAN-JOSÉ GANUZA juanjo.ganuza@econ.upf.es
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain
Abstract. We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituency sets required levels for
a given set of activities. Each activity is carried out by an external provider and its realization is supervised
by a bureaucrat. Bureaucrats are supposed to act on behalf of the constituency, but they can allow providers
to deliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange for a bribe. Given this, the constituency sets the
optimal activity levels weighing off the value of activity levels, their costs, as well as the possibility for the
bureaucrats to be corrupt. We use this setup to study the impact on equilibrium corruption of the degree
of decentralization of corruption. To do this we compute equilibrium corruption in two different settings:
(1) Each bureaucrat acts in such a way as to maximize his own individual utility (competitive corruption);
(2) An illegal syndicate oversees the corruption decisions of the population of bureaucrats in such a way
as to maximize total proceeds from corruption (organized corruption). We show that the illegal syndicate
acts in such a way as to restrain the total number of corrupt transactions and corruption is lower when it is
organized than when it is competitive.
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1. Introduction
Corruption has long been recognized as one of the most important factors affecting the
creation and the distribution of wealth and the last years have witnessed an increased
interest in the topic. Innumerable accounts of corruption cases have received wide expo-
sure in the press, and the concern of the international economic community is revealed
by the efforts that international organizations and consulting organizations devote to the
problem. The OECD’s “Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Off cials
in International Business Transactions” and other projects of the World Trade Organiza-
tion, the United Nations, the Council of Europe are but a few examples of supranational
attempts to f ght corruption. Several consulting organizations, including the Business
International Corporation, part of the Economist Intelligence Unit, and International
Country Risk Guide, part of the PRS Group, provide rankings of countries’ institutional
eff ciency, including bureaucratic eff ciency and corruption.
∗ Corresponding author: Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Getafe (Madrid)
28903, Spain.
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The economic profession has increased its attention to the problem especially since
it has become clear that corruption does not simply lead to redistribution of surplus, but,
due to its illegal nature, also creates a score of additional distortions in the produc-
tion of wealth. Early contributions to this line of research include Tullock’s [16] and
Krueger’s [9] studies of the distortions implied by rent-seeking activities. Mauro [12,13]
uses corruption indices to show corruption’s impact on investment levels, government
expenditure composition, and ultimately on GDP growth.
Recent research has analyzed the different ways corrupt transactions are arranged
ranging from the substantially centralized networks of Italy, the Soviet Union, South
Korea and Japan to the more decentralized systems operating in former Soviet republics,
India and Africa.
An organized corruption network is likely to reduce transaction costs of possibly
complex corrupt agreements, as documented by Cartier-Bresson [3] and discussed by
Goudie and Stasavage [8]. But the economic profession has also indicated that it can
serve as a means to limit the erosion of the corruption revenue base.
In this line of research Shleifer and Vishny [15] argued that when different gov-
ernment assets awarded by corrupt bureaucrats are complements, the bribe sought by
any one bureaucrat increases the cost of the asset and imposes pecuniary externalities on
the other corrupt bureaucrats by decreasing the demand for their assets and ultimately
their ability to prof t from corruption. Shleifer and Vishny [15] argue that if bureaucrats
collude in bribe setting, they internalize the external effects to maximize total corrup-
tion revenue. In the same line Bardhan [2] argued that centralization of bribe setting
also allows “lump sum” corruption that minimizes distortions and the eff ciency cost of
corruption.
The goal of this paper is to focus on an additional channel through which an or-
ganized network can reduce the erosion of the corruption revenue base. We argue that,
if society optimally responds to the existing level of corruption, a higher degree of cen-
tralization of corruption decisions leads to lower corruption levels. We focus on two
alternative setups, one in which each bureaucrat decides individually whether to be cor-
rupt or not, a situation we refer to as competitive corruption, and the other in which the
decision of how many corrupt transactions are carried out is taken by an illegal syndi-
cate maximizing the total net proceeds of corrupt transactions, a situation we refer to as
organized corruption.
We propose a game-theoretical model in which a constituency has to set required
levels for a given set of activities (examples include procurement, regulation, tax col-
lection). Each activity is carried out by an external party, called a provider, and its re-
alization is supervised by a bureaucrat. Each bureaucrat is supposed to act on behalf
of the constituency, but he can allow the provider to deliver a lower activity level than
contracted in exchange for a bribe. Given this, the constituency sets the optimal activity
levels weighing off the value of activities, their costs, as well as the possibility for the
bureaucrats to be corrupt.
We study a situation in which a bureaucrat who intends to be corrupt has to bear
a “corruption entry cost” before the constituency sets the required activity levels and
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in anticipation of them. We believe that this sequential specif cation is especially well
suited to study corruption in that it recognizes there is a moment in which some corrup-
tion costs have already been sunk and cannot be recovered even if the involved parties
decide to pull off a corrupt transaction. Two reasons why this might be the case are the
following:
1. Corrupt transactions are often suff ciently complicated to require early costly arrange-
ments from involved parties.
2. An individual bureaucrat’s cost of arranging corrupt transactions decreases with ex-
perience and a rational bureaucrat should interpret part of the costs borne in the early
transactions as irrecoverable investments that make later corrupt transactions possi-
ble.
Because average corruption payoff is increasing in the activity levels set by the
constituency, and given the constituency’s response to higher levels of corruption is to
reduce required activity levels, in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the organized
corruption game the illegal syndicate acts in such a way as to restrain the total number
of corrupt transactions, so that corruption is lower when it is organized than when it is
competitive.
As opposed to other research in the f eld, our paper makes an explicit attempt to
characterize the constituency’s optimal behavior and how it depends on the degree of
centralization of corruption. The syndicate’s restrained equilibrium behavior mentioned
above has important policy implications for the constituency, as it implies that it is op-
timal for it to choose higher activity levels when corruption is organized than when it is
competitive. In the case of procurement of a good with a quality parameter to be set by
the procurement agency, our results imply that the procurement principal should choose
a higher quality level if corruption is organized.
Our result is similar to Shleifer and Vishny’s [15] in that we also suggest that
organized corruption can serve to curb the negative externalities individual bureaucrats
impose on each other. While Shleifer and Vishny [15] claim that these externalities arise
because the willingness to pay for corrupt acts is decreasing in corruption, we propose
the institutional response to the existing levels of corruption as an additional avenue
through which these externalities might arise.
Apart from the previous similarity a major difference between the testable implica-
tions of our model and the ones of Shleifer and Vishny [15] exists. Our model predicts
that, as compared to competitive corruption, under organized corruption total corruption
is lower and the unit bribe is higher, while Shleifer and Vishny’s [15] predictions are
exactly the opposite. Although we regard the two models as possibly complementary,
the differences in their testable implications can be used to assess the relative merits of
their assumptions.
As mentioned above this paper focuses on the institutional optimal response to
corruption, following a renewed interest in the issue. Laffont and N’Guessan [10] con-
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sider a model of regulation in which the agent may be corrupt and in which the regula-
tor optimally chooses the contract to be offered to the regulated f rm and to the agent.
Ades and di Tella [1] propose a model in which a regulation agent may be corrupt and
argue that an increase in competition parameters that lowers regulated f rms’ equilib-
rium prof ts has an ambiguous effect on the level of corruption due to the regulator’s
optimal response that changes the agent’s wage and therefore his incentives to be cor-
rupt.
In a related paper, Celentani and Ganuza [5], we propose a procurement prob-
lem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project
according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price
and quality. In a similar vein as in this paper, the procurement agent can decide to be
corrupt and allow an arbitrary f rm to be awarded the realization of the project and to
produce a quality level lower than the announced and the principal can select an ap-
propriate competitive mechanism given the anticipated corruption level. We study the
impact on corruption of the increased competitiveness of the environment and show that,
because of the regulatory response of the principal and contrary to conventional wisdom,
corruption may well be increasing in competition.
The paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 presents the model. Sec-
tion 3 derives the equilibrium in the competitive setting. In section 4 we discuss orga-
nized corruption and we compare the equilibrium levels of corruption and activity levels
with the case of competitive corruption. Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
Consider a situation in which a constituency employs a population of bureaucrats with
mass 1. Each bureaucrat is in charge of overseeing a particular activity that is to be car-
ried out by an external party, to whom we refer as a provider. The constituency values
a project carried out at level λ and with price p according to the following utility func-
tion, UC(λ, p) = V (λ) − p. We assume the provider is risk-neutral, that it is common
knowledge that the provider has a cost of realizing activity level λ equal to C(λ) and we
normalize its reservation level to zero.
This kind of situation is meant to represent a wide range of possible instances in
which corruption may take place, with examples stretching from procurement1 (where λ
is the quality of the good or service to be procured) to regulation (with λ representing
a reduction of carbon dioxide emissions) to tax collection (with λ standing for a com-
pany’s employment of minority workers that entitles it to a tax rebate).
1 The purpose of looking at such a simplif ed setting is to avoid unnecessary complications. The reader
interested in a more realistic description of this kind of problem is referred to Celentani and Ganuza [5]
in which we analyze a procurement problem with a f nite number of potential contractors and asymmetric
information on their cost functions. The model we present here retains all the relevant features of this
more realistic setting while simplifying the derivation of the results.
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In the following we will consider payoff and cost functions that satisfy the follow-
ing conditions:
Assumption 1.
(1) V (·) is twice continuously differentiable,
V ′(·) > 0, V ′′(·) < 0, lim
λ→0+
V ′(λ) = +∞, lim
λ→+∞V
′(λ) = 0.
(2) C(·) is twice continuously differentiable,
C ′(·) > 0, C ′′(·)  0, lim
λ→0+
C ′(λ) < +∞.
Bureaucrats are risk-neutral and each bureaucrat can verify whether the delivered
activity level he oversees coincides with the contracted level, but he can also illegally
allow the provider to deliver a lower activity level, λc, in exchange for a bribe, a choice
we will refer to as arranging a corrupt transaction.
In order to be able to arrange a corrupt transaction a bureaucrat has to pay an idio-
syncratic corruption entry cost, β, prior to the constituency announcing λ. To simplify
the presentation we will assume that β is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. If a bureaucrat
pays the corruption entry cost and then arranges a corrupt transaction, he is detected with
probability µ ∈ (0, 1) and in this case he and the provider are imposed penalties, PB > 0
and PP > 0, respectively. The detection probability µ and the penalties PB and PP
are thought of as features of the legal framework and in the following will therefore be
assumed to be exogenously given. If a bureaucrat does not arrange a corrupt transaction,
or if he does but he is not detected, he is paid a f xed wage which is normalized to zero.
As was already brief y mentioned in the introduction, the assumption that a bu-
reaucrat who intends to arrange a corrupt transaction has to pay a corruption entry cost
before the constituency is allowed to set activity levels is justif able for two independent
and complementary reasons.
1. Corrupt transactions often need important arrangements that need to be made with
suff cient anticipation (e.g., establishing an appropriate network). In other words, if
it is reasonable to think that certain details on the transaction will be sorted out in the
end, e.g., the payment the bureaucrat is entitled to, there are other arrangements that
cannot be delayed until the last moment and that require costly provisions.
2. Assuming that bureaucrats have to pay a corruption entry cost at the beginning of
the game implies that there is a moment in which bureaucrats’ decisions to arrange
a corrupt transaction or not are not very responsive to the constituency’s choices. This
effect is meant to describe the high degree of irreversibility of individual decisions to
be corrupt. In other words, being corrupt at any given date lowers the (opportunity)
cost of being corrupt in the future of a long-lived bureaucrat,2 and at any given date
2 This assumption is often used in the corruption literature and has been documented for criminal behavior.
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the bureaucrats that have been corrupt in the past have already sunk a corruption entry
cost3 and are therefore not very responsive to the constituency’s choices affecting the
prof tability of corruption.
The results of the simplif ed and somewhat extreme setup described above can be
shown to hold so long a positive fraction of agents has to decide whether to pay the
corruption entry cost prior to the constituency setting the required activity levels.
Given all of the above, we choose to analyze competitive corruption by making use
of the extensive form summarized in the following:
1. (Stage 1) Each bureaucrat decides whether to pay the corruption entry cost β that
will then enable him to be corrupt.
2. (Stage 2) The constituency publicly announces the required activity level λ.
3. (Stage 3) If a bureaucrat has not paid the corruption entry cost β in stage 1, he can
only instruct the provider to deliver the required activity level and reimburse it the
cost of producing it, C(λ).4
If a bureaucrat has paid the corruption entry cost β in stage 1, he can decide to arrange
a corrupt transaction and in this case he bargains with the provider over a bribe b to be
received in exchange for the agreement that the provider will be permitted to deliver
a lower activity level, λc < λ, and receive a cost reimbursement C(λ).
4. With probability µ the constituency gets a perfect signal of delivered activity level.
If the delivered level is less than the required one, the bureaucrat and the provider are
imposed penalties PB and PP .
The equilibrium concept we use is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
3. Competitive corruption
This section is devoted to the characterization of equilibrium for the extensive form given
above describing corruption in a competitive setting.
Given we are interested in subgame perfect Nash equilibria we will proceed as fol-
lows. In section 3.1 we will focus on stage 3 and characterize the best response of the
bureaucrats to a given activity level λ set by the constituency in stage 2. Section 3.2 stud-
ies stage 2 and focuses on the best response of the constituency to a given γ (fraction
of agents who paid the corruption entry cost in stage 1) given the stage 3 best response
of bureaucrats to a given λ derived in the previous subsection. In section 3.3 we will
turn to stage 1 and study how individual bureaucrats make the decision to pay the cor-
ruption entry cost or not. Section 3.4 combines the previous results to characterize the
equilibrium.
3 A bureaucrat who decides to be corrupt typically sinks a f xed cost to arrange a network of contacts that
can then be used for several transactions.
4 Recall that the f rm’s reservation level is assumed to be 0.
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3.1. Stage 3: Arranging a corrupt transaction and bargaining over a bribe
If a bureaucrat has paid the corruption entry cost β in stage 1, after observing the activity
level λ set by the constituency in stage 2, in stage 3 he is in a position to arrange a corrupt
transaction and to bargain with the provider over the bribe to be received in exchange
for the fact that the provider will be paid C(λ) but will be asked to deliver only λc < λ.5
We assume that the outcome of the bargaining process between the corrupt bureau-
crat and the provider is the solution to a generalized Nash bargaining problem. Let πB(λ)
denote the agreement payoff to a corrupt bureaucrat when the activity level set by the
constituency is λ and dB his disagreement point. Let πP(λ) denote the agreement payoff
from a corrupt transaction to the provider when the activity level set by the constituency
is λ and let dP denote the provider’s disagreement point. For a given activity level λ, the
equilibrium bribe b(λ) will then be given by the solution to the following problem
max
b(λ): (πB,πP )(dB,dP )
(
πB − dB)α(πP − dP)1−α.
A type β corrupt bureaucrat’s agreement payoff is
πB = b(λ)− µPB, (1)
i.e., bribe minus expected penalty;6 his disagreement level will simply be his constant
reservation wage which has been normalized to zero, dB = 0. Given activity level λ, the
provider’s agreement payoff is
πP = C(λ)− C(λc)− b(λ)− µPP ,
i.e., the payment it receives, minus the cost of producing activity level λc, minus the
bribe, minus the expected penalty; its disagreement point will be its payoff without
corruption, dP = 0. Given this, it is easy to show that the equilibrium bribe paid by
the provider to the bureaucrat is
b∗(λ) = α[C(λ)− C(λc)− µPP]+ (1− α)µPB. (2)
Substituting (2) into (1) we get the Nash bargaining equilibrium payoffs for the bureau-
crat and the provider
πB∗(λ)= α[C(λ)− C(λc)− µ(PP + PB)] = α[C(λ)− k], (3)
πP∗(λ)= (1− α)[C(λ)− C(λc)− µ(PP + PB)] = (1− α)[C(λ)− k], (4)
where we let k = C(λc)+ µ(PB + PP ) > 0. It is immediate to see that if
C(λ)− k > 0, (5)
5 In terms of the procurement example we referred to above, λ can be interpreted as the quality of a given
product or service to be supplied and C(λ) the cost of supplying it, with λc and C(λc) representing,
respectively, the quality supplied under corruption and the cost of supplying it.
6 Notice that the corruption entry cost β is paid before entering the bargaining stage. Being a sunk cost,
it is paid regardless of whether an agreement is reached or not and it is to be disregarded in computing
agreement and disagreement payoffs.
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i.e., if corruption creates a strictly positive surplus to be shared, πB∗ > dB = 0 and
πP∗ > dP = 0 both hold and b(λ) is increasing in the bureaucrat’s bargaining power α.
When
C(λ)− k  0,
i.e., when the surplus to be shared in the bargaining is nonpositive, no corrupt transaction
will be arranged and therefore no bargaining will take place.
Letting λmin be such that C(λmin)− k = 0, one can summarize the previous obser-
vations by saying that if λ > λmin, each bureaucrat who had paid the corruption entry
cost in stage 1 arranges a corrupt transaction in stage 3, as he will f nd it strictly prof-
itable, and when λ  λmin, no bureaucrat will arrange a corrupt transaction in stage 3, as
it is strictly unprof table.
3.2. Stage 2: The optimal activity level
Consider a situation in which the constituency faces a continuum of bureaucrats with
unit mass and suppose the constituency knows that a fraction γ of them has paid the cor-
ruption entry cost. Given the constituency does not know the identity of the bureaucrats
that have paid the corruption entry cost (i.e., that are in a position to be corrupt) this is
equivalent to believing that any particular bureaucrat has paid the corruption entry cost
with probability γ . Suppose the constituency sets an activity level λ. If a bureaucrat had
not paid the corruption entry cost in stage 1, he can only be honest and guarantee that
the delivered activity level is the required while paying the provider a price equal to the
cost of delivering λ, C(λ). If a bureaucrat had paid the corruption entry cost in stage 1,
from the previous section we know that he will arrange a corrupt transaction with the
provider if and only if λ > λmin; in this case he would require only λc of the provider, he
would announce that the delivered activity level is λ and would accordingly pay C(λ) to
the provider. If on the other hand λ  λmin, a corrupt transaction generates a nonpositive
surplus for the bureaucrat and the provider and it would therefore not take place.
Given this and because all activities are ex ante identical for the constituency, the
activity level set by the constituency for each bureaucrat is the solution to the following
maximization problem:




V (λ)− C(λ), max
λ>λmin
(1− γ )V (λ)+ γ V (λc)− C(λ)
}
. (6)
The second term in the external maximand is the maximized utility of the constituency
when λ > λmin, i.e., in the set of values of λ that imply that all the bureaucrats that paid
the corruption entry cost (mass γ ) arrange a corrupt transaction as they f nd it prof table
(therefore a fraction γ of the activities are carried out at the level λc); the f rst term
is instead the maximized utility of the constituency when λ  λmin, i.e., in the set of
values of λ that imply that all the bureaucrats that paid the corruption entry cost give
up the option of arranging a corrupt transaction as they f nd it unprof table (no corrupt
transaction would be arranged).
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Let λ(γ ) be implicitly def ned by the f rst-order condition of the second maximiza-
tion problem in the external maximand in (6) above7
(1− γ )V ′(λ(γ )) = C ′(λ(γ )) (7)
and let λNC = λ(0) > 0, i.e., def ne λNC as the optimal activity level for the constituency
when no bureaucrat paid the corruption cost in stage 1. Notice that under assumption 1,
λ(γ ) exists, is unique, positive, and f nite and that
λ
′
(γ ) = V
′(λ(γ ))
(1− γ )V ′′(λ(γ ))− C ′′(λ(γ )) < 0. (8)
Notice also that (8) together with λ(1) = 0 and the continuity of λ(γ ) imply that
when λNC > λmin there exists a γ ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that λ(γ ′) = λmin and λ(γ ) > λmin if
and only if γ < γ ′.
The following function refers to a situation in which λ(γ ) > λmin, i.e., γ ∈ [0, γ ′),
and describes the excess payoff for the constituency from setting λ = λ(γ ) (and ac-
cept that the mass of bureaucrats who have already paid the corruption entry cost will
carry out corrupt transactions) rather than λ = λmin (and in this way have no corrupt
transactions arranged in stage 3)
h(γ ) = (1− γ )V (λ(γ ))+ γ V (λc)− C(λ(γ ))− (V (λmin)− C(λmin)). (9)
Given h(γ ) is continuous for all γ ∈ [0, γ ′), h(0) > 0, h(γ ′) < 0, and, from the
envelope theorem, h′(γ ) = V (λ(γ ))− V (λc) < 0, h(γ ) has a unique zero, γ˜ ∈ [0, γ ′).
For the following it is also useful to def ne (S) as the set of probability distribu-
tions over S ⊆ R+.
Given all of the above we are in a position to summarize the constituency’s best
response to a given fraction γ of bureaucrats having paid the corruption entry cost, λ(γ ),
as follows:
Lemma 1. The best response correspondence of the constituency to a given fraction γ
of bureaucrats having paid the corruption entry cost, λ(γ ), is
(1) If λNC  λmin,
λ(γ ) = λNC.
(2) If λNC > λmin,
λ(γ ) =

λ(γ ) if γ ∈ [0, γ˜ ),
({λmin, λ(γ )}) if γ = γ˜ ,
λmin if γ ∈ (γ˜ , 1].
7 The second order condition (1−γ )V ′′(λ(γ ))−C′′(λ(γ )) < 0 is satisfi d since (1−γ ) > 0, V ′′(λ(γ )) < 0
and C′′(λ(γ )) > 0.
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Proof. Given (8) implies that λ(γ ) < λ(0) = λNC for all γ ∈ (0, 1], assumption 1
implies that setting λ > λNC, is inferior to setting λ = λNC for γ ∈ [0, 1]. This, together
with assumption 1 implies that we can restrict attention to λ ∈ (0, λNC].
(1) When λNC  λmin no corrupt transaction is arranged in stage 3 for λ ∈ (0, λNC].
Given we can restrict attention to λ ∈ (0, λNC], and given λ(0) = λNC is the optimum
level of λ when no corrupt transaction is expected in stage 3, the optimum for the con-
stituency is λ = λNC.
(2) Recall we can restrict attention to λ ∈ (0, λNC]. When λNC > λmin we can
partition the set (0, λNC] into (0, λmin] and (λmin, λNC].
Consider f rst λ ∈ (0, λmin]. For all λ ∈ (0, λmin] none of the bureaucrats who paid
the corruption entry cost in stage 1 will arrange a corrupt transaction in stage 3; Given
λNC > λmin, and V (λ)− C(λ) is increasing in λ for λ ∈ [0, λNC), for any γ , the optimal
value of λ in (0, λmin] is λmin.
Consider now λ ∈ (λmin, λNC]. For all λ ∈ (λmin, λNC] all bureaucrats who paid
the corruption entry cost in stage 1 will be corrupt in stage 3, and this implies, that for
a given γ , the optimal value of λ in this set is λ(γ ).
The previous two observations imply that the best response of the constituency to
a given γ can only be λmin, λ(γ ) or a probability distribution over them. The rest of
the proof considers a partition of the set of possible value of γ , [0, 1], and provides the
best response in each element of the partition, thus concluding the proof of (2). For the
following recall that 0 < γ˜ < γ ′ < 1.
(1) For γ ∈ [0, γ˜ ), h(γ ) > 0 implies that λ(γ ) gives the constituency a higher payoff
than λmin and the best response of the constituency is therefore λ(γ ).
(2) For γ = γ˜ , h(γ ) = 0 implies that λ(γ ) and λmin give the constituency the same pay-
off and the best response of the constituency is therefore any probability distribution
with support {λmin, λ(γ )}.
(3) For γ ∈ (γ˜ , 1], h(γ ) < 0 implies that λmin gives the constituency a higher payoff
than λ(γ ) and the best response of the constituency is therefore λmin. 
3.3. Stage 1: Paying corruption entry costs
From section 3.1 if a bureaucrat in stage 1 believes that the constituency will set activity
level λ > λmin in stage 2, he anticipates a gross equilibrium payoff of πB∗(λ) from
arranging a corrupt transaction in stage 3 and will therefore pay the corruption entry
cost β if and only it is at least compensated by the gross payoff πB∗(λ), i.e., if and
only if
β  πB∗(λ) = α[C(λ)− k].
If a bureaucrat in stage 1 believes that the constituency will set activity level
λ  λmin in stage 2, he anticipates a gross equilibrium payoff of 0 in stage 3 and will
therefore choose not to pay the corruption entry cost β. The previous arguments can be
summarized by saying the if the bureaucrats believe that the activity level that will be
10
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set by the constituency in stage 2 is λ, the set of types who choose to pay the corruption
entry cost at stage 1
β˜(λ) =

[0, 1] if λ  λmin and α(C(λ)− k)  1,
[0, α(C(λ)− k)] if λ  λmin and α(C(λ)− k) < 1,
∅ if λ < λmin.
(10)
Notice that in the decentralized case we are describing in this section each bureau-
crat has 0 mass and this implies that no bureaucrat has incentives to play in a strategic
way exploiting the f rst-mover advantage and that his decision to be corrupt or not only
depends on whether being corrupt is prof table for him or not.8 Given this and because β
has been assumed to be uniformly distributed on [0, 1], the mass of bureaucrats who pay
the corruption entry cost when they anticipate a given activity level λ, γ (λ), is
γ (λ) =

1 if λ  λmin and α(C(λ)− k)  1,
α(C(λ)− k) if λ  λmin and α(C(λ)− k) < 1,
0 if λ < λmin.
(11)
For λ > λmin, γ ′(·) > 0 and the mass of corrupt bureaucrats is increasing in the antici-
pated activity level set by the constituency.
3.4. Equilibrium
The equilibrium under competitive corruption is obtained combining equations (7)
and (11) representing the best response of the constituency to the stage 1 aggregate
strategy of the bureaucrats and the stage 1 aggregate best response of the bureaucrats to
the anticipated activity level set by the constituency in stage 2, respectively.
The equilibrium is def ned by the following two equations:
λ= λ(γ ) (12)
γ = γ (λ). (13)
Proposition 2. A unique equilibrium (γ̂ , λ̂) exists.
(1) If λNC > λmin, γ̂ ∈ (0, 1) and λ̂ ∈ (0, λNC).
(2) If λNC  λmin, γ̂ = 0 and λ̂ = λNC.
Proof. (1) First suppose that an equilibrium exists in which γ̂ > γ˜ . This implies that
λ̂ = λmin which in turn implies that γ̂ = 0, a contradiction. This implies that there can
only exist equilibria with γ̂  γ˜ .
Let now
g(γ ) = γ − α(C(λ(γ ))− k).
8 In section 4 we will turn to the case in which an illegal syndicate acts on behalf of the population of
bureaucrats and is able to exploit its strategic advantage to increase total corruption proceeds.
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Notice that, given C ′(·) > 0 and λ′(·) < 0
g′(γ ) = 1− αC ′(λ(γ ))λ′(γ ) > 0
and that given λNC > λmin, g(0) < 0. Consider the following three cases:
(1) g(γ˜ ) > 0. Given γ̂  γ˜ the equilibrium condition it is obtained by substituting
λ(γ ) = λ(γ ) into (13) to obtain
γ̂ = α[C(λ(γ̂ ))− k] ⇐⇒ g(γ̂ ) = 0.
Given g(0) < 0, g(γ˜ ) > 0, and g′(γ ) > 0, a unique equilibrium exists with γ̂ < γ˜ .
(2) g(γ˜ ) = 0. Given γ̂  γ˜ the equilibrium condition is obtained by substituting
λ(γ ) = λ(γ ) into (13) to obtain
g(γ̂ ) = 0.
Given g(0) < 0, g(γ˜ ) = 0, and g′(γ ) > 0, a unique equilibrium exists with γ̂ = γ˜ .
(3) g(γ˜ ) < 0. Suppose an equilibrium exists with γ̂ < γ˜ . Then it is obtained by
substituting λ(γ ) = λ(γ ) into (13) to obtain
g(γ̂ ) = 0.
Given g(γ˜ ) < 0 and g′(γ ) > 0 a contradiction arises to the hypothesis that an equi-
librium exists with γ̂ < γ˜ . We will now show that a unique equilibrium exists with
γ̂ = γ˜ .
Let
p˜ = γ˜
α(C(λ(γ˜ ))− k) ∈ (0, 1)
and consider the following strategy prof le:
(C) The constituency in stage 1 plays λ(γ˜ ) with probability p˜ and λmin with proba-
bility 1− p˜.
(B) Bureaucrats with corruption entry costs less than or equal to γ˜ pay the cor-
ruption entry cost in stage 1. If the realization of the constituency’s strategy in
stage 2 is λmin no bureaucrat arranges a corrupt transaction in stage 3; If the
realization of the constituency’s strategy in stage 2 is λ(γ˜ ) all bureaucrats who
had paid the corruption entry cost arrange a corrupt transaction in stage 3.
Given the expected payoff from paying the corruption entry cost in stage 1 to a risk
neutral bureaucrat is γ˜ , all bureaucrats with corruption cost less than or equal to γ˜ ,
a fraction γ˜ of the total, will pay the corruption entry cost. Given λ(γ˜ ) and λmin are
the constituency’s best responses to γ˜ , the previous strategies constitute an equilib-
rium. Observing that the best response of the constituency is ({λmin, λ(γ˜ )}) and
that p˜ is the only probability of playing λ(γ˜ ) such that the aggregate best response
of the bureaucrats is γ˜ shows that no other equilibrium exists.
12
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(2) Suppose λNC  λmin. From lemma 1 we get λ̂ = λNC. Substituting λ̂ = λNC
into (13) we get γ̂ = 0. 
Example 1. Suppose V (λ) = log λ, C(λ) = λ, λc = 0.1, µ = 0.5, PB = PP = 0.05,
and α = 1. This implies that k = 0.15 and that λmin = k = 0.15 < λNC = 1. Notice
also
λ(γ ) = 1− γ > λmin ⇐⇒ γ < 1− λmin = 0.85 = γ ′
and that γ˜ = 0.53122. From (11) we have
γ (λ) =
{
λ− k if λ  λmin = 0.15,
0 if λ < λmin = 0.15
and from lemma 1 the best response of the constituency is λ(γ ) = 1 − γ for γ <
γ˜ = 0.53122, any probability distribution on {λmin, 1 − γ˜ } = {0.2, 0.46878} when
γ = γ˜ = 0.53122, and λmin = 0.15 when γ > γ˜ = 0.53122. Figure 1 depicts this
situation by plotting the best response of the constituency to the aggregate strategy of
the bureaucrats, λ(γ ), and the aggregate best response of the bureaucrats to the strat-
egy of the constituency, γ (λ), respectively. Straightforward computations show that the
equilibrium is
λ̂ = 0.575, γ̂ = 0.425.
Figure 1. Competitive corruption in example 1.
13
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Figure 2. Competitive corruption in example 2.
Example 2. Consider a case in which corruption penalties are higher than in the previ-
ous example, PB = PP = 0.1. In this case we would have k = 0.2, λmin = k = 0.2 <
λNC = 1,
λ(γ ) = 1− γ > λmin ⇐⇒ γ < 1− λmin = 0.8 = γ ′
and γ˜ = 0.38995. From lemma 1 the best response of the constituency is λ(γ ) = (1−γ )
for γ < γ˜ = 0.38995, any probability distribution on {λmin, 1 − γ˜ } = {0.3, 0.61005}
when γ = γ˜ = 0.38995, and λmin = 0.2 when γ > γ˜ = 0.38995. Also notice that
λ(γ˜ ) = 0.61005 and that p˜ = 0.95098. Figure 2 depicts this situation. From proposi-
tion 2 equilibrium actions are the following: in stage 1 all bureaucrats with corruption
entry cost less than or equal to γ̂ = γ˜ = 0.38995 (a fraction γ̂ = γ˜ = 0.38995) pay the
corruption entry cost; In stage 2 the constituency plays λ = 0.61005 with probability
p˜ = 0.95098 and λ = 0.2 with probability 1− p˜ = 0.04902; In stage 3 if the realization
of the constituency’s strategy in stage 2 was λ = 0.61005, all bureaucrats who paid the
corruption entry cost in stage 1 arrange corrupt transactions, whereas if the realization
was λ = 0.2 no bureaucrat arranges a corrupt transaction. This implies that the expected
value of λ is
p˜λ(γ˜ )+ (1− p˜)λmin = 0.95098 × 0.61005 + 0.04902 × 0.2 = 0.58995.
Example 3. If corruption penalties are substantially higher than in the previous exam-
ples, PB = PP = 1, λmin = 1.1 > λNC = 1 and even the highest λ that could possibly
be chosen in equilibrium, i.e., the λ that would be chosen if no corruption existed, λNC, is
14
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Figure 3. Competitive corruption in example 3.
not suff ciently high for it to be worthwhile for any bureaucrats to be corrupt (as it is
strictly smaller than λmin). This case is depicted in f gure 3 (notice that from lemma 1
when λmin > λNC the best response of the constituency is λNC for any value of γ ) and in
equilibrium γ̂ = 0 and λ̂ = λNC = 1.
4. Organized corruption
In subsection 3.2 we have analyzed the optimal response of the constituency to a given
fraction γ of bureaucrats having paid the corruption entry cost in stage 1. A higher value
of γ was then argued to have a negative impact on the marginal value of activity levels
and the constituency’s response to it was therefore lower activity levels. Given lower
activity levels lead to lower returns from corruption, it seems natural to ask if corrupt
bureaucrats could improve upon the outcome under competitive corruption and how the
equilibrium would differ from the case of competitive corruption. The goal of this section
is to turn to these questions.
Many cases have been documented in which corruption has been centrally orga-
nized over extended periods of time with examples ranging from Italy, to the Soviet
Union, Korea, and Japan. To study the possibility of bureaucrats coordinating their cor-
ruption decisions, we assume that an illegal syndicate of the population of bureaucrats
centralizes the decision of how many corrupt transactions to arrange with the goal to
maximize the total payoffs to the bureaucrats. We refer to this situation as organized
15
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corruption following Schelling’s [14] def nition of organized crime as an organization
that has monopoly power over illegal activities.
In this section we will focus on the case in which a syndicate centralizes corruption
decisions and sets the fraction of bureaucrats who, by paying the corruption entry cost
prior to the constituency setting activity levels, prepare to arrange corrupt transactions
is stage 3.9 We regard this simple setup as a way to characterize a more realistic situa-
tion in which the syndicate’s time horizon exceeds the ones of the politically appointed
constituency’s representatives and in which the syndicate is in a position to establish
a reputation for playing the Stackelberg strategy, i.e., for setting an aggregate level of
corruption that maximizes total net prof t from corruption given that the constituency
plays a best response to it.10
Under organized corruption the illegal syndicate acting on behalf of bureaucrats
takes into account the constituency’s best response. In other words, the syndicate
chooses a βO such that all (and only) bureaucrats with β < βO pay the corruption
entry cost in stage 1 (and, in equilibrium, will arrange corrupt transactions in stage 3) so











)− k)− s] ds. (14)
To guarantee that an equilibrium exists we make the assumption that, whenever
indifferent between two values of λ, the constituency will choose the higher one. The
following proposition provides a comparison of equilibrium corruption under organized
and competitive corruption.
Proposition 3. Equilibrium corruption is lower and equilibrium bribe is higher under
organized than under competitive corruption.
Proof. We will analyze three different cases:
(1) λNC > λmin and γ̂ < γ˜ ;
(2) λNC > λmin and γ̂ = γ˜ ;
(3) λNC  λmin.
9 It is essential to assume that the fraction of bureaucrats who pay the corruption entry cost chosen by the
syndicate is observed by the constituency before it decides on required activity levels. If the constituency
did not observe this, the equilibrium would be identical to the case of competitive corruption. With respect
to this assumption, see footnote 10.
10 If the syndicate’s horizon is longer than the constituency’s, the simple sequential model we propose pro-
vides predictions in line with the results of the reputation literature initiated by Fudenberg and Levine [7].
In particular notice that even if the constituency observed a noisy signal on the number of corrupt transac-
tions arranged in stage 3 of every period (and not directly the fraction of bureacrats who pay the corruption
cost in stage 1, which is admittedly more diff cult to observe) a suff ciently patient syndicate would be
able to achieve a payoff almost as high as the Stackelberg payoff.
11 In the paper we assume that the syndicate acts on behalf of all bureacrats but the same results hold if the
syndicate only centralizes the decisions of a fraction of bureaucrats.
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(1) In this case the equilibrium indifferent type of bureaucrat under competitive






)− k]− β̂ = 0. (15)
Assume that the solution to the syndicate’s maximization problem is βO < γ˜ . This










)− k)− s] ds.
Notice that F(0) = 0, and, given λ(1) = 0, F(1) < 0.






)− k] > 0 and F ′(0) = α[C(λ(0))− k] > 0.
Given F(0) = 0 and F(1) < 0 this implies that the solution to (14) has to be interior






))− αk − βO + αC ′(λ(βO))λ′(βO)βO = 0. (16)
In the following we will show that any value of βO satisfying (16) is strictly lower
than the indifferent type of bureaucrat under competitive corruption.12 Subtracting (15)








))− k]− βO − α[C(λ(β̂))− k]+ β̂ = −α[C ′(λ(βO))λ′(βO)βO].








))− k]− βO > α[C(λ(β̂))− k]− β̂ (17)
and given α[C(λ(β)) − k] − β is decreasing in β, (17) implies βO < β̂ and γ O < γ̂ .
The previous inequality also implies that λO = λ(γ O) > λ(γ̂ ) = λ̂. Because by (2) the
equilibrium bribe is increasing in λ, the equilibrium bribe will be higher under organized
than under competitive corruption. Given βO < β̂ and we are dealing with the case in
which γ̂ = β̂ < γ˜ , the assumption that βO < γ˜ is satisf ed.
(2) Given γ̂ = γ˜ , to prove the claim it suff ces to show that βO > γ˜ is impossible.
Suppose βO = γ > γ˜ . From lemma 1 we have that λ(βO) = λmin which in turn implies
that no bureaucrat that paid the corruption entry cost in stage 1 will engage in corrupt








12 This argument makes it unnecessary to study the second order condition. Given the solution has to be
a stationary point of F(β), showing that all stationary points are lower than the equilibrium indifferent
type under competitive corruption is suff cient to prove the claim of the proposition.
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Setting βO = γ˜ , on the other hand implies that λ(βO) = λ(γ˜ ) > λmin. This in turn
implies that all bureaucrats who paid the corruption entry cost in stage 1 will be corrupt




















0 α(C(λ(γ˜ )) − k) ds > 0 and γ˜ < γ , setting βO = γ˜ is a prof table deviation
from βO = γ > γ˜ and a contradiction is obtained.
(3) When λNC > λmin, from lemma 1 λ(γ ) = λNC for γ ∈ [0, 1] and implies that
F ′(γ ) = α[C(λ(γ ))− k] = α[C(λNC)− k] < 0 for γ ∈ [0, 1]. Given this the solution
to (14) is βO = 0 and γ O = γ̂ = 0 and λO = λ̂ = λNC. 
Example 4. Consider the same case as in example 1 and recall that when, PB =
PP = 0.05, γ̂ = 0.425 < γ˜ = 0.53122. From proposition 3 we then know that in
the equilibrium of the game with organized corruption all agents with β < βO will pay
the corruption entry cost in stage 1 with βO satisfying (16), i.e.,
1− βO − 0.15 − βO − βO = 0 ⇐⇒ βO = γ O = 0.28333 < γ̂ = 0.425
and this implies that λO = 0.71667 > λ̂ = 0.575.
Example 5. Consider the case as of example 2 in which γ̂ = γ˜ = 0.38995. With
organized corruption from (16) we get
1− βO − 0.2− βO − βO = 0 ⇐⇒ βO = 0.26667.
Given βO = 0.26667 < γ˜ = 0.38995, βO is a solution to the syndicate’s maximization
problem and in the equilibrium with organized corruption a lower fraction of bureaucrats
pay the corruption entry cost than in the equilibrium with competitive corruption
γ O = 0.26667 < γ̂ = 0.38995
and this implies that λO = 0.7333 which is higher than the expected value of λ in the
competitive corruption equilibrium, 0.58995.
Example 6. In the case of example 3, in the equilibrium with organized corruption we
get γ O = γ̂ = 0 and λO = λ̂ = λNC = 1.
As the proof of proposition 3 and the previous examples should have clarif ed,
when γ̂ < γ˜ , equilibrium under organized corruption is always strictly lower than
equilibrium with competitive corruption; but when γ̂ = γ˜ , the equilibrium value
of γ with organized corruption may be strictly lower than γ̂ (as in the example with
PB = PP = 0.1) but it can also be identical to it, as one can readily verify for the case
in which PB = PP = 0.2.
Proposition 3 rests on the following argument. Increasing the number of corrupt
bureaucrats has an obvious direct effect that increases total corruption revenue. Because
18
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Figure 4. Organized corruption in example 4.
higher corruption also implies a response on the part of the constituency that decreases
the activity levels, and, therefore, the prof t per corrupt transaction, increasing corruption
also has an indirect effect that decreases total corruption revenue. Proposition 3 shows
that when bureaucrats centralize the corruption decision, they internalize the indirect ef-
fect of corruption on total corruption revenue (much like a monopolist internalizes the
pecuniary externalities of supply decisions) and restrict the number of corrupt transac-
tions as compared to the case with competitive corruption.
The difference between organized and competitive corruption is shown in f gure 4
representing the case in which PB = PP = 0.05 in examples 2 and 4. Figure 4 re-
produces f gure 1 but it adds a map of isoprof t curves for the bureaucrats. Consider
a point on the bureaucrats’ aggregate best response, (λ, γ (λ)). Since γ (λ) is the aggre-
gate best response to λ,13 it is straightforward to recognize that for the bureaucrats to
have the same aggregate prof ts with corruption levels different from γ (λ) (that is to say
for levels of corruption that are either strictly larger or strictly smaller than γ (λ) and,
therefore, suboptimal given λ), it is necessary that λ′ > λ, so that the isoprof t curves
have a minimum at their intersection with γ (λ). Given higher isoprof t curves are asso-
ciated to higher aggregate prof ts for the bureaucrats, it is easy to recognize that, under
organized corruption, the bureaucrats will choose the point on the constituency’s best
response function λ(γ ) that lies on the highest isoprof t curve, e.g., point γ O < γ̂ in
13 Notice that γ (λ) not only describes the response of individual agents to a given λ, but is also the level
of corruption that maximizes total prof ts from corruption for a given λ, i.e., it is the syndicate’s best
response to a given λ.
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Figure 5. Organized corruption in example 5.
f gure 4. Figure 5 depicts the comparison between organized and competitive corruption
of example 5.
Proposition 3 has important implications for the way in which the constituency’s
optimal behavior depends on the degree of centralization of corruption. Proposition 3
shows that, if the bureaucrats anticipate that the constituency behaves optimally, the
optimal activity level is higher when corruption is organized than when it is competitive
(see examples 4 and 5).
Finally, notice that from (2) the equilibrium bribe is increasing in the equilibrium
activity level λ, and λO  λ̂ implies that equilibrium bribes under organized will be no
lower than under competitive corruption.
The result of proposition 3 is similar to Shleifer and Vishny’s [15]. In their model
a sequence of independent monopolistic corrupt bureaucrats face a market that demands
their services and organized corruption serves to solve the problem of multiple marginal-
ization. In our model, the optimal regulatory response of the constituency implies that
the unit value of corrupt transaction is higher when total corruption is lower and orga-
nized corruption serves to optimally trade off corruption revenue base against corrupt
transaction unit prof t, so that corruption is lower than under competitive corruption.
Apart from the previous similarity, as was mentioned in the introduction, the com-
parisons in proposition 3 of equilibrium corruption under organized and competitive
corruption are opposite to the ones proposed by Shleifer and Vishny [15]. According
to Shleifer and Vishny [15] under competitive corruption the excessive demands of in-
dividual bureaucrats price many potential bribers out of the market so that bribes are
higher and total corruption is lower. To assess the differences between the predictions
of the two models, it is important to highlight the fact that Shleifer and Vishny [15] do
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not allow for bureaucrat heterogeneity and assume that 100% of transactions are cor-
rupt regardless of whether bureaucrats collude or not. Given these assumptions, the total
number of corrupt transactions turns out to be higher when bureaucrats collude (as in
this case they charge a lower bribe). By contrast, we introduce bureaucrat heterogene-
ity, and explicitly focus on the fraction of transactions which turn out to be corrupt in
equilibrium, and, while we endogenize the activity levels, we assume that total number
of transactions (corrupt or not) is f xed.
Because the two models focus their attention on different issues, we regard them as
providing complementary rather than conf icting explanations. But the different testable
implications of the comparisons between organized and competitive corruption of the
two models allow empirical studies to assess their relative merits. While we are not
aware of systematic data on the degree of centralization of corruption, tentative evidence
is provided by anecdotal testimony on the collapse of the Soviet Union. Several authors
have argued that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well as the KGB pro-
vided a central structure for corrupt exchanges, and that the end of the Soviet Union has
given way to a much less centralized organization of corruption in Russia.14 According
to survey data by the International Country Risk Guide, this transition has witnessed
a signif cant surge in corruption,15 a f nding in line with the predictions of this paper.
Before concluding we want to mention that a straightforward implication of propo-
sition 3 is that the equilibrium under organized corruption Pareto dominates the equilib-
rium with competitive corruption as corruption is lower and corruption prof t is higher.16
We believe that such a welfare comparison should be discounted and should not be taken
as grounds for sensible policy implication as the model we consider does not keep into
account other features of organized corruption that may make it less appealing from the
point of view of society, as, for instance, a better technology to decrease the effectiveness
of deterrence policies.
5. Conclusions
This paper proposes a simple model of bureaucratic corruption and studies the possibil-
ity of bureaucrats centralizing corruption decisions. The main goal of the paper is to
analyze if an illegal syndicate acting on behalf of the population of bureaucrats is able to
improve upon the outcome that obtains when bureaucrats make the decision to be corrupt
14 See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny [15], Bardhan [2], and Leitzel [11]. In referring to Russian Maf a,
Judge Giovanni Falcone claimed that it lacked the unitary structure of sicilian Maf a: “There is no sense
in calling something a Maf a when it is not” [6, p. 102].
15 The International Country Risk Guide is a monthly publication of the PRS Group and it includes a rat-
ing of corruption risk from 0 (highest risk of corruption) to 6 (lowest risk of corruption). According
to data published by the International Country Risk Guide and assembled by the IRIS Center (Univer-
sity of Maryland), Russia’s corruption rating in 1985–1991 was 4, went down to 3.5 in 1992, and to 3
in 1993–1995. Leitzel [11] shares the view the corruption in Russia increased as a consequence of the
reforms that followed the failed putsch of August 1991.
16 The same result is obtained by Shleifer and Vishny [15].
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individually and what implications this may have on the equilibrium level of corruption.
Our main f ndings can be summarized as follows:
1. When corruption decisions are centralized (organized corruption) corruption is lower
and bribes are higher than when corruption decisions are decentralized (competitive
corruption)
2. When corruption decisions are centralized, the constituency’s activity levels are
higher than when corruption decisions are decentralized.
The results rely on the assumption that the constituency affected by corruption
responds optimally to it in a way that reduces the revenue per corrupt transaction
unit. When this element is taken into account, i.e., when it is clarif ed that corrup-
tion may extinguish its culture medium, it is easy to recognize that corruption revenue
is not monotonically increasing in corruption level. When bureaucrats individually de-
cide whether to be corrupt or not, they disregard the indirect effect that their decision
to be corrupt has on other bureaucrats’ corruption revenue. Under organized corruption,
on the other hand, the effect that increasing corruption has on total corruption revenue
through the constituency’s response is internalized and the illegal syndicate acts in such
a way as to restrain the total number of corrupt transactions as compared to the case of
competitive corruption.
In an attempt to focus on the difference between competitive and organized cor-
ruption, this paper made use of a simple one-period model. The results we propose can
be generalized to more realistic intertemporal settings but an interesting issue is the ad-
ditional implications the results of this paper can have on the dynamics of corruption.
Making use of the results of this paper and of a related paper, Celentani and Ganuza [4],
that studies explicitly the dynamics of corruption with overlapping generations of cor-
ruptible agents, it is possible to make the following testable predictions on the transition
from organized to competitive corruption or vice versa.
(i) If a competitive setting prevails when corruption is in the organized corruption
steady state, corruption will follow a nonmonotonic path: its level will f rst jump
up and will then converge down to the new higher steady state;
(ii) If organized corruption suddenly prevails at the competitive corruption steady state,
corruption will monotonically decrease down to the new lower steady state.
The lack of reliable data on the degree of centralization of corruption decisions
makes the task of empirically testing the predictions of our results a signif cant chal-
lenge. But available evidence on post communist Russia provides encouraging if tenta-
tive support to our predictions.
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